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Introduction
Today, China’s public hospitals manage 90% of consultations for whatEnglish-speakers would call ambulatory care or outpatient care, and90% of hospital inpatient admissions. (1) As such, public hospitals deal
with demands for treatment by consultation just as they must deal with
treatment for inpatients.
China is in the midst of a paradox. There has been a spectacular upward
surge in health indicators, matching the similar increase in economic indi-
cators. It is also a colossal market, with healthcare expenditures reaching
$511.3 billion in 2013. (2) That is equivalent to 5.6% of GDP. (3) On the other
hand, the health system has officially been described as inefficient, and
there is a toxic atmosphere between medical staff and patients. 
Before we examine the healthcare system in all its various permutations,
we will first offer a brief overview of the current state of China’s health and
healthcare. In 2015, mainland China had a natural population growth of
5.21 per thousand, with a crude birth rate of 12.37‰ and a crude death
rate of 7.16‰. Urban residents now account for 54.8% of the total popu-
lation (or 1.4 billion people). The population is 51.2% male and 48.8% fe-
male. (4) Life expectancy has improved considerably over the years: while in
1990 it was 67 years for men and 70 for women, by 2010 it had risen to
72.5 for men and 76.8 for women. Likewise, the mortality rate for children
under five and the maternal mortality rate have seen distinct improve-
ments. However, it is also apparent that medication (especially antibiotics)
is currently being over-consumed. It is acknowledged that 70% of prescrip-
tion medicines contain antibiotics. (5) One consequence of this inappropriate
medication use is an increase in morbidity and mortality. Lianping Yang et
alii (6) estimate that each year, 2.5 million patients are admitted to hospital
suffering from unwelcome medicinal side-effects. (7)
On the economic front, gross domestic product (GDP) is not far behind
that of the United States. (8) While the growth rate appears to be slowing
down, (9) it is nonetheless expected to reach 6.9% for the year 2016. (10)
Overall, the general level of wealth among the population is on the rise. In
1990 the per capita GDP was 1,644 RMB, whereas by 2012 it had reached
38,420 RMB. 
As a result, the Chinese healthcare system has been forced to adapt, not
only to demographic changes but also to a demand for new treatments:
from dealing with a low-income population with a high birth rate and high
death rate, primarily requiring basic care, it has moved to looking after a
comparatively older population with a low birth rate and higher income,
demanding ever-more-effective healthcare treatment. Since the economic
reforms, the expected level of treatment quality has risen considerably,
which de facto reduces the number of establishments able to meet these
expectations to only the very best urban hospitals, thus creating high de-
mand and low supply for said treatment, while less reliable healthcare es-
tablishments have found themselves in a situation where there is too much
supply, but insufficient demand.
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Evolution of the Health System
Inefficiency, Violence, and Digital Healthcare
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ABSTRACT: China’s public health system has gone through a number of development stages. This paper aims at showing how, from its inception
as a hierarchical system, the healthcare system then lost its structure, to finally give birth to a focalised system where the first point of entry
in the treatment process has become the hospital, in particular the healthcare establishments that offer the most reliable standards of care.
These days, the widely-acknowledged inefficiencies of the healthcare system have led to a climate of violence between medical staff and their
patients, caused by the overwhelming demand that hospitals must bear, the ambiguous status of public establishments, financial benefits and
other perks for medical staff, as well as the medical staff’s civil servant status, and the implications thereof. Policies to foster the development
of primary health centres are struggling to gain traction, while digital healthcare offers promising solutions and is developing fast.
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This demand for healthcare provided by “trained and qualified” medical
staff has led to a decrease in the supply available to meet the demand,
and therefore to ever-longer waiting times and ever-shorter consulta-
tions. Treatment prices have shot up, which can be explained in part by
the lack of qualified staff on offer, but also by the state’s withdrawal of
funding from public hospitals. Moreover, doctors with a financial stake
in the profitability of their establishment tend to over-prescribe and over-
diagnose, and the cost of medication has shot up, all against a backdrop
of corruption. 
The doctor-patient relationship has therefore been transformed into a
dynamic of conflict in the face of exorbitant treatment costs, extremely
long waiting times, ever-shorter consultation appointments, and the in-
creasingly widespread practice of bribery. Paying money under the table
helps to reduce the waiting time and ensure better medical care for the
patient.
In recent years, a number of forms of violence have been witnessed in
Chinese hospitals. It might be a comparatively non-aggressive form of
blame, such as families displaying the dead body of a loved one outside a
hospital; but it can also take a more active form, ranging from fights and
damage to premises to extremely violent acts inflicted on medical person-
nel, sometimes even involving help from organised gangs. (11) When entered
into the usual search engines, the keywords “hospital, violence” bring up
hundreds of news articles relating stories of doctors who have been injured
or killed by patients. (12)
In July 2015, an article in China Daily reported a 600,000-strong online
petition by doctors calling for an end to attacks on medical staff. (13) This pe-
tition came in the wake of one patient’s violent attack on a doctor during
his shift at a Tier-3 hospital (Longmen xian renmin yiyuan 龙门县人民医院)
in Guangdong Province. The local health and family planning commission
responded by demanding that a police branch be set up inside the hospital,
and regular patrols carried out, in order to facilitate swifter intervention in
the event of violence. Surveillance cameras and alarms were also installed. (14)
The healthcare system has been through several phases of development.
The economic reforms of the 1980s introduced market mechanisms to
varying degrees, leading to extreme disparities in access to healthcare, not
only between rural and urban areas, but also within the areas themselves.
After that, it became necessary to ensure that basic healthcare was acces-
sible to all. There were two co-existing philosophies: universal access to
basic treatment thanks to a tightly-regulated market, while for other forms
of treatment, competition would be encouraged to develop within the pri-
vate sector. The new series of reforms (15) were announced in March 2009
by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party. They were followed by the 12th
Five-Year Plan (2012-2016), and now by the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-
2020), which sets out new directions for the future. 
Henceforth, the health sector is booming. On one hand, the number of
medical and health establishments is constantly growing. This growth in
supply is visible in urban and rural areas alike, and in both the public and
private sectors. Nonetheless, there are major disparities to this growth,
which this paper will proceed to explore. (16) On the other hand, the sector
is employing an ever-growing number of people. In 2015, it accounted for
7.39 million workers. (17) Behind these increases lies a real political desire to
expand the network of hospitals and healthcare. The demographic changes
within Chinese society also entail an increased number of social welfare es-
tablishments. (18)
However, one obstacle to the creation of this system is the lack of
mobility among medical personnel. Due to their status (equivalent to
that of a civil servant, with a certain number of additional privileges),
medical personnel display a strong preference for working within a pub-
lic organisation. For reasons that will be explained later, medical per-
sonnel that meet the new standards of demand for “trained and
qualified” staff are only found in the largest, highest-performing public
establishments. (19) The result of this is that, while the supply is diversi-
fying, the demand remains centred on the highest-quality public es-
tablishments.
The Internet would appear to provide a solution to this concentration
of demand. In a later section, I will show how the Internet is being con-
sidered as a solution to help resolve the endless waiting-room queues
at high-quality public health establishments. I will explain the Internet’s
role in easing pressure thanks to its potential as a telemedicine tool, but
also a tool for remote advice and consultation. (20) The result is that pub-
lic hospitals appear more accessible, thanks to the fact that patients no
longer need to queue in the waiting room, and demand is more man-
ageable. Similarly, if the demand for consultations that would usually
be held at a public establishment can be partially met via the Internet,
this could also lead to a reduction in demand for treatment. If the pres-
sure of demand is eased somewhat, it is likely that waiting times will
be reduced and consultations made longer, thereby improving dialogue
between medical staff and patients. Furthermore, this also introduces a
form of competition between physical consultations and virtual consul-
tations, which may allow for the cost of physical consultations to be
lowered. However, the solutions offered by the Internet are not without
their drawbacks, raising issues such as data confidentiality, the identity
of the staff responsible in the event of medical wrongdoing, and also
the question of standardising and supervising the quality of service on
offer.
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The literature on the Chinese healthcare system describes its develop-
ment, its reforms, and the effects of these reforms, (21) in particular the ef-
fects of introducing health insurance. However, very little has been written
on the topic of violence, (22) and even less on the emergence of digital tech-
nology as a solution to the inefficiencies of the Chinese health system. 
In the first part of this paper I will outline the health system’s evolution,
from its institution in the post-Mao era to the present day, while also touch-
ing on the effects of the economic reforms. In the second part, I will focus
on describing the key factors that have led to the rise in violence between
medical staff and patients, and the government’s attempts to introduce pri-
mary care centres as a new point of entry for the treatment process. In the
third part, I present the effects of these reforms in their current state, and
the solutions offered by the use of e-health, as well as the benefits and lim-
its of that approach.
This paper draws upon materials such as press articles and official state-
ments, regulatory texts, official websites, and scientific articles published
in both English and Chinese. It also makes reference to interviews carried
out in Shanghai and Beijing between March and December 2015. Among
those interviewed were doctors at Tier 1, 2, and 3 hospitals, health centres,
hospital financial directors, hospital information systems directors, nurses,
researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and Fudan
University, and managers at consulting firms. 
The structure of the hospital network 
In rural areas…
Up until the 1980s, in rural areas the Chinese healthcare system was di-
vided into three levels of treatment access. (23) The first level was equivalent
to free clinics in villages; the second comprised health centres for the town-
ship; the third was represented by the county hospital. (24) This was the struc-
ture that made up the public healthcare system for each community.
Treatment was mostly guaranteed free of charge, but the quality of treat-
ment was poor.
Between 1966 and the start of the 1980s, nearly every village community
had access to a free clinic, corresponding to Tier 1. In these clinics, treatment
was administered by local workers who had been given a few weeks of train-
ing and were known as “barefoot doctors.” They provided preventive treat-
ment, ambulatory care, and first aid. 
The Tier-2 healthcare establishments had a more advanced level of equip-
ment than the free clinics or the township health centres. They dealt with
patients who suffered from more serious illnesses. Patients were sent to
these establishments when their condition required it. 
Tier-3 hospitals were at the district level. Their purpose was to deal with
more serious conditions, and they were better-equipped than Tier-2 estab-
lishments. They were also staffed by more senior personnel. Beyond this,
there existed yet larger hospitals with even higher grades of equipment.
These hospitals operated at the provincial or national level.
As highlighted by Therese Hesketh and Wei Xingzhu, (25) and also by
Winnie Yip and William C. Hsiao, (26) between the 1950s and the start of
the 1980s the structure of China’s healthcare system allowed the country
to make clear improvements to the health of its population. A number
of indicators (presented in the introduction) attest to this. However, the
level of care available was relatively low, using equipment of mediocre
quality.
From 1991 onwards, the Chinese government promoted the creation of
private organisations. The services provided by these private establishments
were, overall, of a higher quality than those offered by public healthcare es-
tablishments. With the advent of economic reforms and decollectivisation
(at the beginning of the 1980s), the people’s communes that funded public
services were dismantled. The community medical system found its funding
cut dramatically, and sometimes this funding even disappeared completely.
Existing public establishments were either replaced by private ones, or put
into competition with them. As a result, Tier-1 public establishments began
to collapse due to a lack of funding, leaving rural areas without public
healthcare treatment. This meant that in rural areas, people had to cover a
shorter distance to reach the nearest health centre, but in order to reach a
public establishment they would have to travel further, as attested by John
S. Akin et alii. (27) The overall effect of this was that, on average, local popu-
lations discovered that the sources of treatment on offer had become pri-
vate, and more expensive. 
At the same time, Tier-2 and Tier-3 public healthcare providers acquired
an increasing level of autonomy, including over the management of their
profits. This allowed them to develop their equipment and acquire new
medical technology. This was coupled with a rapid withdrawal of funding
from the state and the provinces. (28)
Now that they had little or no public subsidy to rely on, public establish-
ments were no longer subject to a duty of public service. Moreover, with
public health establishments now behaving like commercial enterprises,
economic theory dictated that the supplier should seek to maximise its
profits. (29) The fact that they had an effective monopoly over their local ge-
ographic area allowed public providers to set their own prices. 
The price of healthcare (consultations, treatment, and medication) sky-
rocketed. This disruption to the treatment supply was paired with an in-
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crease in revenue, leading in turn to revenue inequalities. The differences in
the quality of treatment on offer between the cities and countryside be-
came more pronounced. In addition, there was no longer an obligation to
pass through Tier-1 organisations in order to reach tiers 2 and 3. De facto,
the rural population found itself offered a choice of establishments at which
to seek medical consultation. 
As a consequence, the rural population developed a preference for estab-
lishments in urban areas, especially those that offered an excellent level of
quality. This was also facilitated by greater mobility among a certain sector
of that population: there was a rapid decrease in the proportion of rural res-
idents within the total population, and a growing number of them began
commuting and working further from home. One possible correlate of this
phenomenon was a considerable improvement in the state of the roads,
and because of those improvements, journey times were reduced. The pop-
ulation became progressively less reluctant to traverse long distances and
spend hours, or even days waiting in line for outpatient treatment. 
For financial reasons, the lack of healthcare access became a major prob-
lem, first for the most vulnerable among China’s population, and then for an
increasing proportion of rural dwellers. (30) The introduction in 2003 of a pub-
lic insurance system brought momentary respite, although it did not resolve
the issue in any lasting sense. (31) Furthermore, this health insurance system
only made minor inroads into the healthcare network. In fact, if patients
went to a hospital outside their local area, the rural public insurance system
penalised them with a lower reimbursement (or none at all) for treatment. (32)
Even now, repayments for consultations remain very low, meaning that pa-
tients and their families are usually prepared to relinquish them. 
All this has meant that in recent years, the very best hospitals in urban
areas were, and still are, forced to deal with significantly higher demand
than was intended. 
We can therefore clearly see that since the 1980s, the treatment system
in rural areas has moved 1) from a decentralised, structured system where
the patient had no choice in their treatment pathway, where quality stan-
dards were low, and where there was little or no inequality in terms of treat-
ment access, to 2) a centralised, destructured system where patients are
free to choose their treatment pathway and where demand is centred
around the highest-quality hospitals in urban areas, creating a shortage of
supply, where top-quality treatment is demanded as standard, where there
are major inequalities in access to treatment, and where a sector of the
rural population would be excluded from the system, if it weren’t for the
state’s implementation of public health insurance. 
….and in urban areas
In urban areas, from 1949 to 1980, access to treatment was largely or-
ganised by and within state-owned enterprises. (33) Each enterprise managed
access to treatment on behalf of its employees and their children, as well
as setting up a pension in preparation for retirement. These enterprises were
gargantuan in size, and their sheer scale made it possible to spread potential
risks. Just as in rural areas, the system was extremely decentralised. 
As far as healthcare establishments were concerned, each patient was
cared for by the establishment that was affiliated to their enterprise. Then,
according to the gravity of the patient’s condition and the establishments’
abilities to accommodate them, the patient would be sent either to a dis-
trict hospital, a municipal hospital, or a provincial hospital. At the highest
level was the central hospital. 
With the advent of economic reforms, state enterprises were transformed
into private or semi-private businesses. They were divided up. In urban areas,
the dismantling of the great state enterprises led to a breaking-up of med-
ical insurance into smaller-scale units. The collective aspect of social security
was henceforth managed independently by each enterprise. As a result, it
found itself weakened: enterprises that were now smaller in scale soon
found they were struggling to fund their own social security. Two main rea-
sons accounted for this: firstly, since the units were smaller, the insurance
was supported by a smaller number of individuals; in addition, these units
were now supposed to turn a profit without any support from the state.
However, a portion of their profits was used to provide social security for
their employees. Bankruptcies piled up and threatened to destabilise the
whole system. Threatened with impending economic collapse, the govern-
ment was forced to take action, and decided to relieve the enterprises of
the financial burden that came with social security. At the same time, the
government introduced a public form of social security. This was much less
extensive than its previous incarnation, but had the advantage of at least
existing, in contrast to the situation in rural areas. As a result, urban residents
were subjected to a decline in quality within their social security system,
while the overall structure was preserved. 
With the economic reforms and the dismantling of the state enterprises,
a certain number of hospitals that belonged to what had once been large
enterprises were transformed into local hospitals and managed by the var-
ious health departments. They owed their existence to the reforms carried
out since the 1980s and offered a level of quality that was often deemed
substandard by the population, both in terms of the medical staff (whose
doctors were less well trained than elsewhere) and in terms of the facilities
available for treatment. 
In 1989, a hospital accreditation system was created by China’s Ministry
of Health. This was an initial attempt at classification. Since the year 2000,
a new list, divided into three levels (and three subsidiary levels) has been in
place, as well as a supplementary level for hospitals judged to be at an “ex-
cellent” level. A distinction was also drawn between profit-driven establish-
ments and their non-profit counterparts, as well as between public and
non-public. (34) This classification was accompanied by policy that focused
on government subsidies and the levels of taxation that these establish-
ments would have to pay. The first level is reserved for the most basic in-
frastructure, while the third level encompasses the largest infrastructure.
Meanwhile, a proactive policy was introduced to increase the supply of
primary healthcare. In France, this primary care would be equivalent to a
consultation at a doctor’s surgery in a town, ambulatory care, or treatment
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at a city health centre. These structures did not offer admission to hospital.
For the Chinese government, the aim was to create consultation opportu-
nities outside the hospital system. A certain number of Tier-1 hospital cen-
tres were also converted into primary care centres. 
To conclude this first part, the number of hospitals has now grown from
18,000 in 2003 to more than 25,000. The majority of these (roughly two-
thirds) are public establishments. The hospital network is now being com-
plemented by an ever-greater number of primary care centres. These include
urban health centres, health centres in rural townships, and external con-
sultation centres. In total, there are more than 900,000 care centre struc-
tures available. (35)
Behind these developments lie profound geographical disparities. The vast
majority of care centres (72.2%) can offer only rudimentary facilities and
healthcare. Beijing, which is a province-level municipality, has five times
more hospitals per capita (429 for a population of 10 million) than the
province of Guangxi (88 for 10 million). Similarly, while the number of hos-
pital beds has risen considerably since the 1960s, here too extreme dispar-
ities are found. (36) Graph 1 illustrates the differences between urban and
rural areas in terms of medical personnel and patient capacity.
In urban areas, we will also show how the structured, centralised system has
developed into a system where demand is centred on the highest-achieving
establishments. The series of reforms, including the major reforms of 2009,
produced an increased supply of primary care facilities. However, people seem
reluctant to choose this type of treatment pathway, and demand remains low.
In short, it is possible to say that when we describe the supply of treat-
ment available in China today, we are “talking about public hospitals.”
Yinao or violence within hospitals
Yi医 (medical) nao闹 (argument/violence): each year, more than 10,000
doctors are estimated to be attacked. In 2010 the number of disputes rose
to 17,243 cases, a 70% increase when compared to 2004. According to one
2012 report, (38) the rate of clashes between healthcare staff and families is
increasing by 22.9% per year. One survey, carried out across ten provinces,
found that half of all Chinese doctors have been the object of verbal attacks,
while one-third have been physically threatened. (39)
We have seen how the Chinese health system has been destructured
and how demand has become concentrated around first-rate hospital
establishments. But how can we explain the fact that this destructuring
and centralisation creates inefficiencies that give rise to a situation
where violent acts are becoming more numerous and more pronounced?
What are the key reasons for this rise in violence? I identify three main
points, which are i) the previously-mentioned overwhelming demand
for public establishments and the consequences thereof, connected to
the changing public status of healthcare establishments, as well as ii)
the specificities of Chinese public hospitals and the financial perks for
doctors, and iii) the fact that doctors have a dual-status as both civil
servant and cadre of the Party (bianzhi 编制) (40) with all that that im-
plies. 
Inefficient distribution of demand and its
consequences
While the supply of community health centres (CHCs) offering primary
care has massively increased within the space of a few years, Tier-3 hospitals
offering a higher level are seeing an ever-greater number of outpatients for
consultation, and even more are being admitted to hospital. Between 2007
and 2011, the number of admissions grew by 56%, and hospital consulta-
tions by 33%. Graph 2 displays the changing number of hospital admissions
and consultations between 1993 and 2012. 
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However, in interviews with doctors working at Tier-3 “excellent” grade
hospitals (also known as 3AAA) and with patients at the aforementioned
health centres, one regularly hears the same responses. 
It is better to queue up in a hospital that can provide quality health-
care than to visit a more local centre, which is on a more human
scale but does not offer the desired quality of treatment. In any case,
Tier-3 hospitals provide an “all-in-one” option that CHCs and Tier-1
hospitals cannot offer, due to their fragmented nature. (41)
This means that now, it is fair to say that public hospitals cover the vast
majority of medical outpatient consultations and hospital inpatient admis-
sions. Across China as a whole, public hospitals account for 89% of the total
number of beds, 91.6% of all admissions, and 91.7% of all outpatient con-
sultations. (42) According to one survey, 20% of patients who receive hospital
consultations are suffering from colds or gastroenteritis. (43)
This situation has dramatic consequences on healthcare spending. It is es-
timated that 30% of admissions are medically unjustified. The cost of an
admission is calculated to be 37 times more than that of a consultation.
Furthermore, in China the length of a hospital stay is twice as long as the
average time recorded among OECD nations. (44) Although this is only an
average figure, statistics such as these are worrying because they account
for such a significant portion of healthcare expenditure. Certainly, this in-
creased demand can be explained by the urbanisation of the population,
but not by that alone: as explained previously, many people in rural areas
are also driven to seek treatment at the top-ranked hospitals, for outpatient
care as well as inpatient care.  
When public health insurance was introduced in rural areas in 2003, one
of the benefits could have been a redesigned pathway to treatment; but
the implementation of this public insurance system was determined at the
establishments where treatment was provided. 
In both rural and urban areas, the introduction of various forms of public
health insurance helped to reduce patients’ out-of-pocket expenditure (the
amount the patient has left to pay that is not covered by health insurance).
Between the 1990s and the present day, the per-
centage of outstanding charges has decreased in
relation to total expense. According to a report
by the World Health Organisation (WHO), (45) in
1995 the figure was 46.4%, then rose to 59% in
2000, and now stands at 34.9% (Graph 3). How-
ever, on one hand, this figure does not take into
account the significant geographical inequalities,
particularly between city and countryside. On
the other hand, at the same time there has been
a considerable increase in expenditure, both as
a percentage of GDP (from 4.55% in 2006 to
5.15% in 2011) (46) and per capita. This expendi-
ture went from 178 RMB in 1995 to 362 RMB in
2000, and now stands at 1,801 RMB. The result
of this is that, despite an appreciable improve-
ment in health insurance coverage, the out-
standing charges have risen considerably. 
As such, the range of treatments covered and
the level of cover were, and remain, extremely
limited. (47) These measures were not sufficient to
cope with the geographic upheavals among the patient base. There was higher
demand among those seeking quality treatment, and who were willing to
sacrifice accessibility in both geographical and financial terms. Free clinics,
primary care centres, and Tier-1 hospitals were shunned in favour of Tier-2
and especially Tier-3 hospitals. Another consequence of this concentrated de-
mand was that Tier-3 hospitals became overburdened, leading to incredibly
long queues and very short consultation times. The situation was exacerbated
all the more by the fact that these establishments were able to offer high-
performance equipment and quality treatment. At the same time the primary
care centres, along with Tier-1 and a number of Tier-2 hospitals, found their
range of facilities, including their equipment, were being underused. The pro-
portion of beds in use was above 100% in the top-ranked hospitals, while it
was at 80% in Tier-2 establishments, and 55% in Tier-1 establishments. (48)
All this occurred with a large proportion of the population in a situation
of financial instability. With expenditure increasing rapidly, making health-
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Graph 2 – Changes in admission and consultation figures 
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ical Insurance Before and After the 2009 Healthcare Reform,” BMC Health Services Research, Vol. 14, No. 443, 2014.
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care less financially accessible, this gave rise to a certain amount of tension
between patients and medical staff at the top-ranked hospitals.
Waiting time management as a factor in increased
tensions between patients and medical staff
The website of Beijing Hospital (北京医院), one of Beijing’s largest hospi-
tals, claims that the establishment gives 4,500 medical consultations every
day. According to the same source, that translates to between 60 and 80
consultations per doctor per day. When the hospital is held in high regard,
this figure can reach as many as 100 patients per doctor per day, and even
up to 200 on peak days. (49) The Anzhen Hospital received more than 2.41
million patients for consultations in 2014. Within the region, it is one of the
ten hospitals that provide the greatest number of consultations. At the Bei-
jing Children’s Hospital, the number of outpatient consultations reached
3.37 million in 2014. According to one doctor at a hospital in Shang-
hai, (50) “Now, it is not uncommon to see more than 1,000 patients and fam-
ily members waiting in the early hours of the morning.”
In the hospitals that I visited, doctors regularly mentioned appointment
times of two minutes per patient. According to a study carried out in
Shaanxi Province, doctors there spend less than a minute and a half speaking
with the patient. This can sometimes result in hysterical behaviour on the
part of patients and their families. 
By visiting Chinese hospitals it is possible to better understand how out-
patient consultations are managed. The hospital is divided into two sections.
The section dedicated to outpatient consultations is located in an enormous
entrance hall. At its centre is a reception area manned by nursing staff. Their
role is to direct the patient to the appropriate specialist. However, the num-
ber of available nursing staff means that it is not possible to deal with every
request for information. During the course of a group discussion at a large
hospital in Beijing, one doctor explained: 
It is impossible to manage the constant flow of patients, because
there are so many of them. This means that the patients themselves
are forced to choose the appropriate area of expertise for their con-
sultation. The patient is supposed to take a numbered ticket. They
are then registered as requiring an outpatient consultation. Then they
must go directly to the prepayment counter to validate their entry
on the outpatient consultation list. This system creates a lot of frus-
tration for people. (51)
Among these frustrations, two types are especially significant. Firstly, the
lack of general practitioners means that the patient cannot always be cer-
tain which specialist they should consult. Their waiting time to receive a
ticket, then to consult with a specialist, is made even more difficult by the
lack of certainty that they have chosen the right person. 
Secondly, another consequence of such intensive demand is that a black
market for selling tickets has developed. Even though taking a ticket to wait
in line incurs a cost, the amount is so negligible that it provides no disin-
centive to trading tickets, particularly at Tier-3 establishments. One example
of this can be found at one of Beijing’s best-equipped hospitals, Peking Uni-
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versity Renmin Hospital (Beijing daxue renmin yiyuan北京大学人民医院),
where tickets cost 5 RMB each and only a limited number are distributed
each day. On the black market the price of these tickets can soon soar as
high as 200 RMB, or even beyond that, further adding to the cost of a con-
sultation. Taking into account waiting times that can extend up to several
days, extremely short consultation times, and the black market for tickets,
it is easy to understand the sense of frustration, or even anger among pa-
tients, which can drive them to commit violent acts. Added to this is the
practice of “red envelopes”: bribes handed to hospital staff, including doc-
tors, as another way of cutting waiting times, as well as ensuring better care
for patients in the event that they are hospitalised. (52)
Funding methods for establishments and personnel
as a causal factor in the rise of violence 
Generally speaking, at the start of the 1980s, the state funded 60% of the
spending in hospital establishments. By 2003, this funding had shrunk to
an average of 7%. In the period from 1979 to 1991, the government intro-
duced a co-payment system for healthcare establishments. The aim of this
was to offer greater flexibility in terms of profit, and thereby to encourage
establishments to improve their quality of treatment and increase the pro-
fessional standards of their medical staff. (53) In order to cope with the short-
fall in funding, healthcare establishments turned to medication and
diagnostic procedures as their main source of income. In 1992, the Ministry
of Health officially granted greater autonomy to all public hospitals, allow-
ing them to charge for their services and sell them at a profit. They were
responsible for their losses and debts, but in return they keep any surplus
generated by their business. They self-funded a large part of their invest-
ments in equipment and infrastructure. They could also join forces with pri-
vate organisations to create joint ventures, as well as invest in a profit-driven
healthcare department within the structure of the public hospital itself. 
Public hospitals in China now have the distinguishing feature that, like
other businesses, they are supposed to maximise their profits by choosing
investments and fixing prices, while simultaneously retaining the traditional
governance structure of a public institution. For example, funds allocated
by the state or by local authorities are granted exclusively to public hospi-
tals. (54) Additionally, managing staff is the responsibility of the central public
sector authorities, in particular the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security (MOHRSS): it is they who determine how the workforce is struc-
tured and who gets promoted. The connection between the central powers
and hospital organisations still exists, despite the hospitals’ autonomy. Hos-
pitals still have an effective monopoly over their geographic region, which
leads to a lack of competition and therefore a lack of price regulation by
the market. When the cost of treatment is fixed by the hospital organisation,
with no regulation (from either administration or the market), this can cre-
ate a problematic situation. So, in summary, public hospitals have an incen-
tive to increase their revenue by providing increasingly expensive (and
therefore profitable) treatments, without any regulatory framework (either
by the market or by the state or the provinces). (55)
Moreover, given the way that public hospitals currently operate (as de-
scribed earlier), doctors and hospital staff can also receive supplementary
income via a series of opaque rules. This supplementary income is reliant
on the public establishment’s activity as a profit-making business. It is there-
fore easy to understand why doctors might be encouraged to take steps to
increase their most lucrative practices: increasing the number of appoint-
ments, over-prescribing, over-diagnosing. Consequently, the “operational ob-
jective” for treatment personnel and for doctors includes maximising profits.
Within this setup, both parties benefit: not only the hospital management
but also the medical staff. An occupation in which remuneration was, until
now, disconnected from any profit-driven influence becomes a race for fi-
nancial gain. Today, medical drug sales make up over 40% of turnover for
public health establishments. It is the patients who suffer, with the cost of
healthcare increasing drastically in parallel with the overconsumption of
treatment, creating a climate of ever-growing tension between medical
staff, doctors, and patients.
Why is it difficult to decentralise the supply of
quality treatment that is causing these tensions?
There are approximately 2.79 million (registered) doctors practising in
China, 90% of whom have received training in Western medicine, rather than
exclusively in traditional Chinese medicine. The training process for doctors
in China is relatively complex and varies according to geographical region. In
2013, only 28.5% of the treatment on offer in hospitals was provided by
staff who had received at least degree-level training. (56) In rural areas, 70%
of the medical and treatment staff had gained no further qualifications since
secondary school. (57) Theoretically, a “rural” doctor would not be able to prac-
tice in an urban area, because his level of training would be too low. That
said, the doctor’s seniority could also be taken into account.
While doctors at Tier-2 hospitals are increasingly qualified with higher edu-
cation degrees, many of them still leave with training that is roughly equivalent
to taking a specialist subject at sixth-form. By contrast, the doctors at Tier-3
health establishments are educated to university level, and are increasingly
able to benefit from continuing education. This situation is constantly evolving. 
After obtaining a degree, young doctors become employees of the estab-
lishment where they find a post. If they obtain a post at a Tier-3 public hos-
pital, they are also granted the status of civil servant (bianzhi). This status
applies not only to doctors but also to a large section of the medical staff,
guaranteeing a job for life as well as other benefits in terms of medical su-
pervision and retirement. In addition, this marks the beginning of a double
career: on one hand, the doctor progresses within the hospital structure,
while on the other also progressing within the Communist Party, the two
careers mutually supporting one another. 
Furthermore, one condition of gaining bianzhi status is that today, medical
staff working in hospitals do not have the option of working simultaneously
for another organisation, either in the same locality or elsewhere. Their pro-
fessional registration number is linked to a medical structure. For a doctor
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who has civil servant status, deciding to work within a private structure
would therefore mean losing this status, with no possibility of getting it back. 
As a consequence, it is extremely difficult for private structures to recruit
doctors with the very best qualifications. The status of doctors, the benefits
that come with this status, and the various forms of supplementary income
create a significant disincentive to working within a private structure. (58)
Over a given geographic region, this therefore has a powerful limiting effect
on the possibility of competition: only the public sector remains attractive,
due to the quality of its medical personnel. However, one of the experimen-
tal aspects of hospital reform has been the possibility for practitioners to
operate within another structure than the one where they are professionally
registered. According to researchers at CASS and at Fudan University, (59)
while in theory the reform makes this possible, in practice doctors are dis-
couraged from such behaviour by their hospital’s management and admin-
istration. The measures used to deter them include a reduction of doctors’
bonuses, along with reductions to other supplementary income and a po-
tentially harmful effect on their career progression. (60)
Beyond the effects on finances and status, there are other, secondary con-
sequences. The lack of highly-regarded doctors available to work in private
structures leads these structures to hire less talented doctors, thereby en-
gendering further rejection of these establishments, both by promising
young doctors and by the patient base. An Hua and Li Peng, two doctors at
a top-ranked hospital in Beijing, would not be opposed to going to work
within a private structure. (61)They said that their working hours, the number
of patients, and the toxic atmosphere between patients and medical staff
at their current workplace was a considerable burden on them both. How-
ever, they were not aware of any private structure that was able to offer
them a team of sufficient size, or a stimulating working environment. 
As a result, there is a strong correlation between highly-trained teams of
doctors and first-class hospitals, although there remains a certain amount
of variance. For a patient base that is not fully acquainted with the staff
distribution of each healthcare structure, going to a highly-ranked hospital
is one way of ensuring they are treated by a “reliable medical team.”
University think-tanks make a case for the idea that questioning bianzhi
status among medical staff could help to reintroduce a sense of motivation.
According to Hengpeng Zhu, Deputy Director at the Institute of Economics
and Head of Public Policy Research at CASS, bianzhi status has a negative
effect on the efficiency of medical establishments. He also suggests that this
status should either be modified, or only used in limited circumstances. (62)
To conclude this part, as explained previously, patients are almost exclu-
sively concentrated around large hospitals (Tier-3 or 3AAA), which are also
the hospitals with the best quality equipment. Doctors at these hospitals
must i) cope with the influx of patients who prefer to visit these establish-
ments and ii) look after their patient base while simultaneously maximising
the cost of consultation. 
All this occurs within an environment where information is in limited sup-
ply and the patient cannot judge for himself or herself whether their treat-
ment and prescriptions are appropriate.
The contribution of digital technology and “virtual
healthcare”
On the one hand, we see the inefficient geographical distribution of sup-
ply, creating medical “deserts” within Chinese territory; on the other, we see
the inefficient geographical distribution of demand, leading to overcrowding
at Tier-3 hospitals through disorganised or misused primary (ambulatory)
care facilities: all of which points to digital technology as a potentially ap-
pealing solution, allowing supply to connect with demand, regardless of
physical location. In this part we will see some of the innovative solutions
that have been put forward.
The Chinese health system currently finds itself in a situation where there
is little or no oral communication or dialogue between the treatment supply
and the treatment demand. An atmosphere of mistrust has replaced the doc-
tor-patient relationship that existed before the 1980s, even with doctors
who had only a basic level of training. Time was a less important factor.
Today, the time allotted to patients by doctors with a “Western” style edu-
cation (63) (that is, five or more years of study after high school) is too short,
since these doctors are mostly located in Tier-3 hospital establishments
where consultation times are now less than two minutes. At the same time,
doctors who have less training but are still sufficiently qualified to deal with
a large part of the demand for primary care, do not encounter said demand.
Added to that is an increase in patient’s out-of-pocket expenditure (64) while
the doctors receive financial compensation in correlation with the rate of
healthcare expenditure. All this leads to a dynamic of conflict between hos-
pital personnel and the patients or their loved ones, which can sometimes
culminate in extremely violent behaviour. We will see how the Internet can
be used as a first step in responding to some of the Chinese health system’s
inefficiencies: for instance, greater communication through online advice
and communication, and telemedicine, which provides access to qualified
doctors, even in medically “deserted” areas. Furthermore, the means by which
establishments and doctors are funded is one of the key factors in the current
conflictual relationship. One way to effect change is to introduce alternative
payment models, limiting the incentive to over-prescribe or over-diagnose.
The funding method that seems most suited to achieving these objectives
is one that first appeared in the United States, based around groups of related
illnesses. The generic term is Diagnostic Related Group (DRG). It requires
large quantities of high-quality information on the medical aspect of the
patient’s stay, including pathology, diagnoses, procedures performed during
the stay, and length of stay. Such a DRG-basis funding method depends on
the implementation of a performing database system of information.  
The Internet as a tool for professionals, helping to
distribute the supply of “excellent” healthcare
As we have seen, the expectations in terms of quality have visibly changed
since the economic reforms of the 1980s. Patients or their families are willing
to travel many miles for a consultation at a hospital establishment that meets
these expectations, which leads to the oversaturation of services. Digital tech-
nology offers a solution to this by, on the one hand, allowing greater virtual
communication between professionals and helping to distribute medical
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knowledge; and on the other hand, making use of the virtual realm to facilitate
clinical collaboration (as in the case of telemedicine described below).
Firstly, there is the Clinical Decision Support System, a tool that helps
practitioners avoid medical errors. It provides warnings about side-effects,
allergies, and other undesirable consequences. Initially introduced in the
1990s, it is now used in only a minority of cases. The sudden escalation in
smartphone use has allowed for greater flexibility when it comes to access-
ing these assistance tools. There are now applications and platforms that
give professionals online access to research papers, such as the platform in-
troduced by Ding Xiang Yuan in 2000. Today, more than 880,000 doctors
consult the platform. Doctors are also modifying their prescription habits,
based on information available via the Internet. 
Another more effective means of helping professionals is also made pos-
sible thanks to telemedicine. The concept of telemedicine was introduced
in 1999, in a circular from the Ministry of Health, encouraging two health-
care institutions to use it as a communication tool. By 2013, according to
statistics published by the NHFPC (National Health and Family Planning
Commission of the People’s Republic of China), 2,057 medical institutions
were using this type of method. On 29 August 2014, the NHFPC published
guidelines regarding telemedicine services in China. These documents were
soon made public. (65) In them, the opinions put forward promoted a more
intensive use of telemedicine by medical institutions. They reflected efforts
by the Chinese government to bring telemedicine into general use all over
the country. Telemedicine was seen as a tool that could resolve, at least in
part, the geographical disparities that existed. And so, to deal with these
physical, geographical difficulties, a digital solution was put forward. 
Using the Internet to eliminate the black market for
waiting line tickets
The Internet, along with mobile phone applications, can also be used to
regulate and channel demand, in order to reduce oversaturation at Tier-3
hospitals. In Beijing, the Municipal Commission of Health and Family Plan-
ning confirmed in December 2015 that by the end of 2017, all first-class
hospitals would require their patients to make appointments online, and
would also offer the opportunity to pay online, in order to reduce the need
for queuing on site. This payment method has already been introduced in a
number of Beijing hospitals. For example, since June 2015, one of Beijing’s
largest hospitals, the Beijing Children’s Hospital (Beijing ertong yiyuan北京
儿童医院), has given its patients the option of making an appointment on-
line, as well as paying online, via an app for mobile phones. Certain hospitals
are even extending their virtual services, using them to send out test results.
We have seen how one effect of excessive demand around Tier-3 estab-
lishments is an increase in waiting times. In such cases, the Internet would
appear to be an obvious way to mitigate the need to physically wait in line.
However, it does not reduce the total time spent waiting for a medical con-
sultation or hospital admission, and the Internet should therefore be con-
sidered only one solution among many. 
The Internet as a new healthcare supply market 
As previously explained, a major proportion of patients are deeply mis-
trustful of treatment provided by doctors who do not work within the top-
ranked hospital organisations. Since a doctor’s medical practice is
intrinsically connected to a hospital, there is a sense in which they “belong”
to that hospital. Consequently, there is almost no mobility among “trained
and qualified” doctors. However, a grey area does exist in the form of con-
sultancy. According to a legal researcher at CASS, (66) the status of “consul-
tant” falls under a judicial grey area that allows doctors to work outside
their own hospital organisation. This means that a doctor who belongs to a
given hospital can offer consultations virtually via the web, without under-
mining the principle of working within a single medical practice. Offering
consultations over the Internet can be considered simply as consultancy. 
For patients, the most commonly used applications are the ones that offer
online consultations. This is a way to avoid long queues in hospital and/or
to receive a first or second opinion from a specialist who is practicing at a
top-quality hospital. There are Internet platforms where doctors can offer
advice based on information provided by the patient. One example of this
is Chunyuyisheng, which numbers more than 15 million users and 10,000
fully qualified doctors. As far as supply is concerned, the development of
digital healthcare has opened up new business possibilities for doctors, with-
out requiring them to travel to another establishment. Their status as con-
sultants means that doctors are not subjected to the consequences of
carrying out a secondary business. 
The benefit of the Internet, therefore, is that it gives patients access to
doctors who can meet their desired standards, with consultations some-
times costing less than they would in a hospital (where “red envelopes” and
the black market for tickets could further increase the face value of an ap-
pointment). Consequently, digital access to the treatment market seems to
be gaining dominance over other forms of access promoted by the state,
such as creating more primary health centres for consultations. However,
the prescription and distribution of medication are obstacles to the digital
realm. Currently, discussions are taking place about the creation of an as-
sociation to bridge the gap between virtual consultations and the primary
health centres that would provide a space for giving out medication. It
would seem that, on one hand, the Internet makes it possible to resolve the
problem created by lack of mobility among doctors at Tier-3 hospitals. On
the other, the Internet creates a market in competition with these estab-
lishments, which until now held a monopoly over their geographical locality. 
There are also platforms allowing direct mobile communication between
patients and doctors. During my visits to Beijing, I was able to test out
WeChat, as well as e-mail, as a means of doctor-patient communication at
several of Beijing’s hospitals. The advantage is that, without having to travel,
it is still possible to ask your doctor questions or request further information
following a medical consultation. However, these services are not regulated,
which poses issues of responsibility for the doctors practicing in this way.
The question of data confidentiality is also a pertinent one.
Digital technology and its contribution to a new
funding method for hospitals 
We have seen the influence that funding methods for healthcare estab-
lishments can have on the conflictual dynamic between healthcare person-
nel and their patients. Here we will see how the Internet can intervene, by
setting up a new payment method that is partly separated from the pre-
scription and diagnosis process. 
48 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 6 / 4
65. The views of the NHFPC and an English translation can be found at the following site:
https://www.healthcarelawtoday.com/wp-content /uploads/sites /15/2014/09/China-
Telemedicine-Opinions-Aug-29-2014.pdf (accessed on 31 October 2016).
66. Interviews in Beijing, October and November 2015 (in English).
Special feature
Internationally, there is widespread agreement (67) on the advantages of a
hospital pricing scale that is based on the establishment’s activity, because
this type of pricing helps to prevent over-prescription. China is no exception,
and is also keen to implement the same pricing scale. (68) However, this pric-
ing system requires a complex information base, containing extremely ex-
haustive and standardised data. Hospital visits are classed with a code,
depending on the actions taken and diagnoses made during the stay. Each
code is linked to a price. 
Another purpose of the reforms is to improve the health system’s IT ca-
pabilities, which are, at the moment, comparatively basic. In 2012, the MoH
invested $9.5 million (69) in developing methods for recording medical data
and improving information systems in Chinese hospitals. The goal is to cre-
ate data that are standardised, especially regarding the characteristics of
the patients, in order to better respond to their needs and thereby limit the
atmosphere of tension that is prevalent today.
The first phase set out by the Ministry of Health is to routinely collect, in
a standardised manner, information that might be useful for supervising
staff (and/or the paying agency), for healthcare providers, and (on an indi-
vidual level) for the patient’s medical file. One of the purposes is to obtain
a wide-ranging collection of Electronic Medical Records (EMRs). In certain
regions, such as Beijing, IT systems that use this same procedure have al-
ready been developed, and are being contributed to by several major uni-
versity hospitals and other hospital structures. Other regions have also
launched pilot projects to implement EMRs, such as the provinces of Jiangsu
and Fujian. (70)
Conclusion and discussion
I have shown that patients’ expectations have become higher over time.
They have been increasingly demanding over what a “trained and qualified”
doctor should mean. As a consequence, the actual, addressable supply has
been shrinking, creating longer and longer queues coupled with shorter and
shorter consultation times. In parallel, the price of treatment has spiralled
upwards due the financial autonomy of hospitals, as the government has
withdrawn its support and doctors have been incentivised to generate rev-
enue through over-diagnosis and over-prescription.
What with skyrocketing costs, extreme waiting times, consultation time
reduced to a bare minimum, added to rampant bribery throughout the sys-
tem, the patient-doctor relationship has progressively become conflictive.
To address this situation, measures haven been taken to increase the num-
ber of public primary health centres and to encourage the development of
the private sector in order to fuel competition among providers, or even to
limit profit margins, for example by implementing “zero mark-up” policies
on a list of essential medications. Yet, all of these have had limited impact.
Digital technologies offer a promising route to develop innovative solutions
to fix the current inefficiencies in the health system in China.
On the flip side, digital solutions also have their shortcomings. One of
them is that this market is entrusted to a handful of giant private players.
In order to achieve certain specific goals, the Chinese government made
the decision to outsource certain public service tasks to profit-driven
companies. There are therefore questions being raised about the poten-
tially dominant position in which these firms could soon find themselves.
Concerns about these conflicts of interests have become increasingly
prominent in the light of recent scandals. I will conclude this paper with
some of these stories, focusing on three Internet giants (Baidu, Alibaba, and
Tencent), with an emphasis on the implications for the Chinese health sys-
tem that is currently under construction.
The Baidu Tieba Forum, part of Baidu (the Chinese equivalent of Google),
is an Internet forum administrator. It contains more than 10,000 sub-fo-
rums, including forums for exchanging healthcare information. In recent
months, a number of scandals have erupted (71) over the capacity for private
companies to take control of these non-commercial forums, allowing ads
for medical products of dubious quality. The flashpoint for this was the case
of a forum on haemophilia (a blood disorder). It was displaying advertise-
ments that extolled the virtues of healthcare providers that turned out to
be unlicensed and of poor quality. More recently, in May of this year, a stu-
dent who died of cancer had published a long post where he placed the
blame squarely on Baidu for irresponsibly exaggerating the capabilities and
quality of the hospital where he chose to have treatment.
The government has sought to implement a platform that would authen-
ticate and track pharmaceutical products (Product Identification Authentica-
tion and Tracking System, or PIATS). (72) PIATS was outsourced by the China
Food and Drug Administration to Ali Health, a division of Alibaba. Beyond the
questions raised over a private, profit-driven enterprise collecting personal
medical data, the company appears to be embroiled in a conflict of interest,
in the sense that the company itself sells medication online (Alibaba an-
nounced that the running of online pharmacy Tmall Online would be trans-
ferred to Ali Health (73)). This gives Ali Health a major role in regulating
healthcare products and privileged information on those very same prod-
ucts. (74) PIATS management drew attention to the dual responsibility of taking
part in the regulation of pharmaceutical sales while simultaneously operating
within that market. To placate the other operators in that sector, it was an-
nounced that pharmaceutical companies will be exempted from drug tracking
fees for a period of three years. But what lies in store after that? (75)
In conclusion, we can say that digital healthcare offers multiple sources
of improvement but is not in itself a fully-fledged solution to fix all ineffi-
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ciencies of the Chinese healthcare system. It needs to be integrated into a
strong-willed set of policies, including a redefined patient journey and clear
monitoring of private actors carrying out missions of public service. This is
obviously still a work in progress.
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